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I Introduction1
Food aid is both over-studied and under-studied:
there is a disproportionately large literature on food
aid compared to other aspects of aid (and, indeed,
compared to many other aspects of development),
characterised by its singular failure to reach any kind
of agreement on the fundamental issues.2 These
include whether there should be food aid at all, the
most appropriate commodities to be used, the types of
use to which food aid should be put, and the criteria
for deciding who should receive it, on what scale, and
under what conditions.
At the same time, food aid has been inadequately
studied in many respects, notably in terms of its
impact on recipient countries. Despite some early
pioneering work [Ginor 1963; Aktan 1965; Cout-
soumaris et al 1965], the paucity of impact studies has
been an important limitation on attempts to improve
the planning and programming of food aid and has
been reflected in the frustration felt by many observers
attempting impartial evaluation [eg Maxwell 1978a,
1978b; Schuh 1979]. The validity of this general
observation is not contradicted by the existence of
competent individual case studies [eg Grissa 1973,
Stevens 1979]. Fortunately, there is increasing
awareness of the need for better impact assessment,
not only to make sense of the acrimonious debate
surrounding food aid, but also to improve the
management of programmes which now cost some
US$2,600 mn a year (1980) and account for around
10 per cent of total official development assistance
[OECD 1981].
It is the purpose of this article to help clarify the issues
surrounding impact assessment and in particular to
look at the practical problems attendant upon any
attempt to improve the monitoring and evaluation of
food aid impact. Section II looks in more detail at the
'The author is indebted to Shirley Downs for her help in the pre-
paration of this paper and is pleased to acknowledge the comments
of other colleagues. Responsibility is his alone.
2For a general review of the literature on food aid see Maxwell and
Singer [1979]. A recent, and polemical, analysis is provided by
Jackson [1982].
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role and function of impact assessment and
distinguishes it from other monitoring and evaluation
functions. Section III turns from general concepts to
the particular problems of assessing the impact of food
aid. In Section IV a method is proposed for designing
systematic impact assessment which at the same time
economises on the scarce resources of time, money
and organisation. Finally, Section V draws the
argument together and suggests what might be done
next by food aid donors and recipients interested in a
better understanding of the impact of their efforts.
As a preliminary to all this, and by way ofjustification,
two anecdotes will be recounted, loosely based on fact.
Both concern large, respectable and generally
competent food aid agencies anxious to establish the
impact of their programmes. The first is concerned
with 'programme' food aid, delivered to recipient
countries in bulk, for sale on the open market as a
resource to permit faster growth; and the second
concerns food aid delivered to specific projects for
direct distribution to recipients on food for work sites
or supplementary feeding programmes.
In the first case, the Agency commissioned an
evaluation study'which would look at the impact of its
programme, and allowed for less than one month's
fieldwork in the country concerned. The evaluation
team of two people expected to find that the proceeds
of food aid sales had been paid into a separate
government account or 'counterpart fund', and that
particular additional projects would have been funded
from this account: these projects could then be
counted as the benefit of the food aid. Once they
arrived in the country, however, a number of
disturbing factors became clear. The first was, perhaps
unsurprisingly, that no counterpart fund existed and
that all the funds raised by selling food aid had been
absorbed into the consolidated fund. This meant that
it was in practice impossible to identify any particular
projects. The government did, however, claim to have
funded certain projects with food aid resources and
these were shown to the mission. But it was apparent
to the mission that these were high priority projects
that would have been funded anyway as part of the
country's food security system and that they were
faced with a clear case of 'fungibility', in which it was
impossible for them to identify any particular
additional activities made possible by food aid. As
they considered this, they also stumbled over a further
problem which was that the particular projects that
might or might not have been financed by a
counterpart fund were a very poor proxy for the effect
that food aid might have on growth. In a narrow sense
this was because the food had been sold at highly
subsidised prices so that the counterpart fund, had it
existed, would have been very much smaller than the
notional value of the food aid. And in a broader sense,
it was because the macro-economic contribution of
the food aid transfer as a foreign exchange
supplement, was probably greater for this country
experiencing a severe balance of payments crisis than
the simple measure of the value of food sold. By the
time that this analysis had been completed, the month
was up and it was time for the mission to return to
headquarters with only a very vague idea as to the
possible developmental effect of the food aid.
The second evaluation team faced similar problems,
although it was working for a different agency on a
different type of project. Its task was to assess the
impact of a food for work project, and it too was given
less than a month in the recipient country in order to
collect data and reach its major conclusions. On
arriving in the country the mission found that almost
no information existed either about the socio-
economic status of the participants in the food for
work scheme or about the costs and benefits of the
public works on which hey were engaged. It quickly
discovered that the 'project' which had been funded by
the agency was in fact a highly diverse set of essentially
separate projects in different parts of the country,
where ecological and social conditions were quite
different. And it also found that apart from the direct,
internal costs and benefits of the project, there were
also significant indirect or external effects which
needed to be studied, particularly with respect to the
market for local produce and to the supply and
demand for labour in the project areas. Again, the
mission was forced to return with only a hazy notion
of the true situation regarding the project and to form
its conclusions on this basis.
These two case studies share a number of
characteristics. In both, the agency lacked a model of
what the impact of its food aid might be, so that, even
at quite a late stage of ex post evaluation,
disagreements could arise as to what constituted a
benefit. Furthermore, in both cases, evaluation
missions were expected to assess the impact of food aid
programmes in situations where no base line data had
been collected and where no systematic procedure had
been set up for monitoring the impact of the project.
And in both cases, the missions were 'rush jobs',
mounted at very short notice and at considerable cost,
allowed very little time for field work and were subject
to great pressure to meet deadlines for handing in their
reports. The result was the same in both cases: in a
sense, an opportunity missed. It is in order to permit
such opportunities to be seized more forcefully in the
future that we proceed with the detailed discussion
below.
II Role and Functions of Impact Assessment3
It is necessary to distinguish impact assessment from
the other types of monitoring and evaluation that
takes place, or ought to take place, whenever
development activities are undertaken. In this, as in
other cases, the food aid specialist can safely draw on a
wider literature dealing with the basic issues. This kind
of connection is not made often enough in food aid
studies where, for example, food for work is often
approached as if there did not already exist a
considerable literature on public works in general. In
the case of monitoring and evaluation systems, a
considerable literature does exist, principally, but not
exclusively, concerned with the monitoring and
evaluation of agricultural and rural development
projects [eg Clayton and Petry 1981].
Two important distinctions are made in the literature.
The first is broadly between the 'efficiency' of projects
and their 'effectiveness': that is between whether
inputs are delivered at the right time and place and in
the right quantities, and are then combined effectively;
and whether or not the outcomes are satisfactory. The
second distinction is between 'monitoring' (defined by
Clayton [1981] as the 'process of measuring,
recording, collecting, processing and communicating
information to assist project management decision
making') and 'evaluation' ('the comparison of actual
project operation, performance, and impact with
those originally specified or planned').
In general it can be said that management tends to
place greater emphasis on monitoring than it does on
evaluation. In the case of food aid programmes it is
probably true to add that rather little emphasis is
placed on either of these, especially when it comes to
committing resources in the field.
The monitoring and evaluation of impact, of course,
raises much wider problems than those encountered in
measuring operation or performance. In the first
place, the necessary indicators tend to be found
outside rather than inside the particular activity; and
3This section draws heavily on the excellent introduction to
monitoring and evaluation problems provided by Clayton [1981].
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external indicators are both harder to measure than
internal ones and less directly under the control of
management. The time dimension is also different
when it comes to measuring project impact: the data
may be required at less frequent intervals but is likely
to take longer to collect. Furthermore, the number
and range of skills required will be much greater when
it comes to impact assessment so that it may be more
difficult to design and maintain an adequate
monitoring and evaluation machinery.
The most obvious role for monitoring and evaluation,
whether of impact or of other elements, is as a
management tool which permits correction to be made
to the activity during execution. It might be found, for
example, that a nutrition intervention programme is
meeting all its targets in terms of food deliveries and
food consumption, but that the expected improvement
in nutritional standards is failing to materialise,
perhaps because of an unexpectedly high incidence of
intestinal parasitosis. The managers of the nutrition
intervention would need to have this kind of feedback
on the impact of the project and would want to take
some corrective action, perhaps the introduction of a
parallel health programme.
At another fairly straightforward level, monitoring
and evaluation of the impact of development activities
can be used ex post in order to improve the planning of
future projects. To follow the example used above, it
might be decided that in all future cases nutrition
intervention programmes should be planned with
greater attention to the health status of the population
and that funds should be provided for a health
programme whenever this was considered necessary.
The distinguishing characteristic of monitoring and
evaluation expenditures is that they are directed to
policy. Data collection and analysis are not cost free
- indeed they may be extremely costly - so that it is
important to control cost effectiveness and to make
sure that policy mechanisms are sensitive to the receipt
of information. There is no point in undertaking
monitoring and evaluation if all the decisions to be
made are in fact decided on quite other grounds.
III The Monitoring and Evaluation of Food
Aid
If there is a need for better impact assessment and if it
can only be met by improving monitoring and
evaluation systems, what precisely should be moni-
tored and what kind of organisation is necessary to
collect the data? The main difficulty lies in the diffuse
nature of the effects of food aid and in the complexity
of the models required to capture all its possible direct
and indirect effects. Two examples will help to draw
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attention to the range of data required and serve to
underline the dimension of the monitoring problem.
The general point is that, at least in principle, the
monitoring requirement is extremely large for
measuring the impact of all types of food aid. This
means that there is a particular need to consider the
cost effectiveness of monitoring and ensure its close
relation to policy.
Food for work projects
Take first the case of a food for work project and
consider the task of forecasting, monitoring and
evaluating its impact. Clearly a set of hypotheses is
needed about the expected impact of the project,
which can then be tested.
The literature on public works, of which food for work
is a special case, suggests that the most appropriate
format for evaluation is a series of cost-benefit studies,
both at the level of the individual participant or
beneficiary and at the level of the village, region or
country as a whole [Maxwell l978b; Burki et al 1976].
The cost-benefit approach allows a measure of the
impact of the project to be compared with the cost of
achieving it; and, because the cost and benefits do not
occur simultaneously, it provides a framework within
which cost and benefit streams can be compared over
time. Furthermore, well established methods exist for
bridging the gap between 'private' cost benefit
analysis, conducted in market prices, and 'social' cost
benefit analysis, conducted in national accounting or
shadow prices; in addition, methods exist, at least in
theory, for the valuation of such social benefits as
better nutrition, greater employment or more equal
income distribution [Squire and Van der Tak 1975].
Direct costs and benefits of a food for work project are
the easiest to identify. Costs will include labour,
materials and supervision; benefits may include such
items as lower transport costs, greater production or a
flow of benefits from fish tanks, forestry or other
production activities. All these can be estimated in
advance and compared with the eventual outcome. A
series of cost-benefit studies will be needed, beginning
with the costs and benefits for individual families or
landowners participating in the scheme and building
up to a whole-project analysis [cf Costa 1978].
The data requirements for this kind of analysis are
large. In the case of farmers receiving assistance with
terracing or land development, for example, the
starting point would be a description of the existing
farm system in sufficient detail to permit calculation of
existing family income. It would then be necessary to
forecast the effect of development activities on such
aspects as yield over time and to build into the analysis
a detailed forecast of future labour and input
requirements, so as to calculate a revised net farm
income after the completion of land development
works. This would permit a comparison of the 'with'
and 'without' project situation, with the costs and
benefits being built up over time in order to permit a
discounted cash flow analysis. This analysis should of
course be prepared before the project begins in order
to test its economic feasibility, and should then be
recalculated both during the course of the project and
after its completion in order to ensure that the
intended effects have been achieved. If different
categories of farm are participating in the scheme it is
necessary to repeat the analysis for different 'model'
farms and to build these up in order to form a picture
of the benefits of the project as a whole.
The kind of information required is not normally
available in published form and is in any case subject
to problems of estimation and error. It will therefore
normally be necessary for project authorities to
generate the data themselves through farming system
Can food for work projects, like this one in Bangladesh, undermine local food production?
surveys, and to repeat surveys at later stages in the
monitoring and evaluation process. Physical and
agronomic information will also be required which
can often only be obtained by investigation of
individual farmers' fields: needless to say this may take
some years, although it may be thought sufficient to
begin with preliminary estimates [for further discussion
see FAO 1981a; Wiggins and Palma 1980].
However, as noted above, the measurement of the
direct costs and benefits is only part of the analysis
required and in some ways the easier part. An
important place has been given in the literature to a
discussion of indirect effects, and two of these in
particular are worth examining. The first is the
provision of employment and improved nutritional
status, which are often included as objectives of public
works schemes [Arlès 1966; Stevens 1979]. For this
impact to be measured, the existing employment and
nutritional status must be recorded and a means of
measuring the changes in nutrition and employment
35
over time built into the project. Given that both
characteristics are subject to many influences v'hich
may be outside the scope of the project itself, it will
also be important to relate any changes in the
population affected by the project to the direct actions
of the project, usually by comparing a sample in the
project area with a matched sample outside it. Once
the size of the benefits has been established, it is
possible to value them for inclusion in a more general
social cost-benefit analysis. The data problem can be
simplified by working with samples and making
selective studies of the nutrition situation and the local
labour market. In both cases, however, it will be
necessary to take seasonal factors into account
[Chambers et al 1979] and to consider not only
average figures but also disaggregated data within
individual families. All this may require longitudinal
studies which are unlikely to be available to the project
authorities and which therefore may have to be
organised explicitly at the time of project preparation.
The second major indirect effect, which applies
particularly to food for work projects, is that of
possible disincentives to local farmers. The disincentive
effect is much discussed in the literature [see eg
Isenman and Singer 1977] and it is clear that any
disincentive to local production should be counted as
a cost to the project and included in any cost-benefit
analysis. This is true even when the disincentive effect
may only be temporary and may disappear at the end
of the food distribution.
The problem begins when an attempt is made to define
the 'disincentive effect' and when hypotheses are
developed for testing. The term is used in many
different senses, all of which may in some way apply to
the project. For example, does the disincentive effect
refer to reduced production of the commodity being
distributed, or of some other commodity which may
or may not substitute for the food aid commodity? Is
the disincentive to be considered as a seasonal or an
annual phenomenon? As a local or a regional one? As
a temporary or a permanent one? And is it caused by
some effect on price, by a reduction of incentives
working through government policy, or by some
direct effect on the labour force in the area? These may
all be important questions that require investigation.
At least five different ways can be imagined in which a
food for work project might cause a local disincentive.
It may compete for labour with local agriculture so
that production is in some way affected (the effect may
not necessarily be a simple reduction in production,
but may encompass changes in production technique
or a change in the cropping pattern on typical farms).
Alternatively, it may be that the availability of food
for work discourages local farmers from planting
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subsistence crops so that they remain idle for part of
the year and become dependent on food aid. A third
possibility is that because of the availability of food
aid, participants purchase less food on the local
market than they otherwise would have done, so that
prices fall and producers respond by cutting output.
Alternatively, in a fourth variant, food for work
participants may sell some of the food on the local
market so that again prices and production are
negatively affected. In both these cases the products
which are affected may or may not be complete
substitutes for the food aid commodity. Finally, in a
fifth variant, production may be negatively affected
because of some disincentive to government to
procure locally or to invest in agriculture [see Jackson
1982, especially chapters 3 and 8].
It is not certain that any of these effects will occur. The
point, however, is that they are extremely complex to
measure, because they are likely to occur in complex
rural societies in which thé markets for labour and
food are closely integrated with social interrelation-
ships [Harriss 1982]. Furthermore, it is not enough
simply to show that food production has been
negatively affected: for policy intervention to be
correctly focused it is necessary to show how it has
been affected and precisely what the mechanism is.
Each of the five scenarios briefly described above can
be broken down and data requirements spelt out. The
data will include household income and expenditure
figures (disaggregated by social class, commodity and
season); analyses of the labour and food markets
(again disaggregated by activity, commodity and
season); studies of market structures which permit
supply and demand elasticities to be calculated; and
studies of government policy which assess the
interaction between, for example, government price
policy and total output. This information is required
continually during both the planning process and the
life of the project.
It is important to emphasize that this is a summary of
the data base required for a rigorous analysis. It is in
fact, in several important respects, an oversimplified
list, since it excludes economies and diseconomies
which occur outside the project area. Possible
incentive or disincentive effects occuring at the
regional or national level as aresult of project food aid
flows have not been discussed, but would need to be
taken into consideration in any serious monitoring
and evaluation exercise.
Programme food aid
Food for work accounts for only a small proportion of
total food aid. Most food aid, perhaps two thirds, is
programme' aid, provided for sale on the market, the
effects of which, though probably fewer than those of
project aid, are very much harder to measure.
The problems were hinted at in Section I which
examined the difficulties inherent in the concept of the
'counterpart fund'. In order to assess the growth
effect, and to study such negative aspects as the
possible disincentive effect of food aid, it would
normally be necessary to make a detailed study not
only of the government's policy towards the
agricultural sector, but also of its general development
effort. Many studies have shown that government
policy is a key element determining whether or not
food aid has a positive effect [Clay and Singer
1982:39]; the difficulty is that present government
policy has to be compared with an estimate of what
government policy would have been in the absence of
food aid, and this is of course speculative. It is for this
reason that complex econometric models are of
limited usefulness because they fail to provide more
than an analysis of the historical association between
food aid deliveries and certain aspects of food
production. They do not explain what government
might have done to increase food production had food
aid not been available, nor do they deal with the
political and institutional complexities of the trade-off
between different government expenditures [however,
see Hall 1980].
One solution is to lay down the expected effects of
food aid before it is delivered, a means favoured by
those who advocate linking food and other aid to the
development of a 'food strategy' [European Parliament
1979, European Communities Commission 1980]. In
this scenario food aid is provided in support of clearly
defined policy and institutional changes designed to
increase a recipient country's food security. Given that
the policy changes required have been spelt out in
sufficient detail, it is possible to monitor both their
adoption and their impact over the life-time of the
food aid proposal. This, of course, imposes
considerable monitoring requirements on both donor
and recipient. It is important to note that monitoring
of this kind has hardly ever been carried out in the
context of food aid programmes and there is little
experience of what kind of field organisation might be
required.
It is clear that, if a programme encompasses various
types of food aid, impact assessment will require
monitoring of many aspects of the recipient country's
development planning and development achievements.
It might be thought that national statistics are more
easily available than data for smaller project
assessment; but it should be remembered that the
quality of statistics in developing countries often leave
much to be desired, especially in the food sector [Lele
and Candler 1978].
Given the complexities, the important question is not
whether impact assessment is possible (it is an essential
ingredient of properly managed food aid programmes)
but of how it should be carried out. It is to this
problem that we now turn.
IV Designing an Operational Monitoring
and Evaluation System for Food Aid
The first point to make is that monitoring and
evaluation systems will have to be built from scratch in
most cases: at present very few food aid programmes,
if any, go beyond the kind of casual evaluation that
was described in the Introduction.
A second general point is that food aid donors cannot
set up efficient monitoring and evaluation systems on
their own. They do not control the data and they do
not have the kind of access to rural areas that is needed
to obtain it. Efficient monitoring and evaluation
ought to be as much in the interest of the recipient as of
the donor, and the priority for the donor should
therefore be to build indigenous capacity for it, with,
where necessary, technical and financial assistance.
Financial assistance is important. Just how costly
monitoring and evaluation will be will depend on the
type of food aid, the pre-availability of information
and the complexity of the assessment required. But as
a rough guide, Clayton has quoted IBRD figures to the
effect that total monitoring and evaluation costs may
be as high as 4.5 per cent of total project cost [Clayton
198 1:9]. The value of food aid in 1980 was $2,600 mn,
exclusive of all in-country administrative and
supporting costs, so that this might imply a
monitoring and evaluation budget (in cash not food)
in excess of $117 mn.
A number of principles should be taken into account
in designing the pilot monitoring systems. In the first
place a certain degree of selectivity will obviously be
necessary: it may be possible to select certain
representative countries for regular monitoring and
evaluation in a global system; it may be desirable to
restrict impact assessment to certain selected issues; or
to concentrate on food aid activities over a certain size.
The aim is to reduce the size of the monitoring and
evaluation exercise without sacrificing its systematic
and planned nature. It is important to be sure,
however, that the items studied are representative of
some wider programme or population: what is being
suggested is essentially a systematic 'case-study'
approach (as opposed to the unsystematic approach
described in Section I), which has many advantages
but some recognised difficulties [Casley and Lury
1981]. Clearly any case study programme should be
carefully and systematically planned to avoid adding
to the haphazard nature of the existing opus.
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A related point concerns the relative importance of the
topics selected for monitoring and evaluation. If a
monitoring and evaluation system cannot encompass
The whole range of effects that would normally be
required to measure comprehensive impact, care must
be taken to select the most important issues for study.
A chosen model should predict what the most
important effects are likely to be, and a simple
monitoring system should trace any actual deviation
from this. For example, it might be decided that, in a
particular case, the local disincentive effect will
probably be small and that it is not worth the likely
expenditure of tracing it. But 'minimal monitoring'
should be built into the system so that if in the event
the local disincentive does turn out to be important,
more resources can be switched into that field.
The step by step procedure might be adopted as a
second general principle in monitoring and evaluation.
It may make sense to devise a system which moves
from the fairly general and superficial to the more
specific and detailed as particular problem areas
develop. In practice a system could be devised which
builds a simple, conceptual model and carries out an
initial cost-benefit analysis to identify the likely
magnitude and direction of the changes resulting from
food aid. A fairly widespread network of monitoring
points could be established, not to provide detailed
data in the first instance, but to signal the appearance
of factors requiring closer scrutiny. The system would
then have the resources to concentrate in greater detail
on these items and to propose remedial action.
If we match this procedure to the food for work
project analysed above, what might be required
initially is a detailed ex ante cost-benefit study at both
the private and social level, capturing the direct and
indirect, internal and external costs and benefits of the
project. It would be normal for the first run of the
cost-benefit analysis to be complemented by a series of
sensitivity analyses to identify the likely effect on
overall profitability of changes in important para-
meters. This preliminary stage would require a good
deal of base line data collection, but the data effort
might be reduced in a second stage as project
implementation began. It might be sufficient to
measure key prices in the markets for labour and food,
and to build on to the regular monitoring of project
operation a skeletal system for measuring the direct
benefits of the project. Only if the analysis of this data
indicated a problem, would a full scale study of the
disincentive effects or of the direct impact of the
project be carried out during project operation. At the
end of the project a full-scale evaluation could be
organised, building on the initial data collected and on
the skeletal monitoring system in place during the life
of the project and collecting further data as necessary.
If special 'issue studies' had been carried out, these
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would obviously be an important contribution to the
final evaluation.
To the two principles of selectivity and a step by step
approach can be added a third, which is the
desirability of using data-economising methods. A
considerable literature now exists on what is known as
'rapid rural appraisal' (RRA): assessment of the
situation in rural areas without resort to the
traditional and often cumbersome technique of the
large scale physical or socio-economic survey [IDS
1981; Pearce and Jones 1981]. It is argued that a slight
loss of accuracy is more than compensated for by
greater speed and reduced cost of using RRA
techniques. They include data collection by 'quick and
dirty' surveys, the use of proxy variables which are
easier to collect than traditional measures and the
mobilisation of alternative sources of information, not
least those supplied by farmers themselves. This
methodology avoids main road bias, dry season bias,
capital city bias and other biases which often appear in
casual monitoring and evaluation exercises [Chambers
1980a, 1980b}.
In all cases, it is evident that both a staff and a budget
are required for monitoring and evaluation; that the
importance of this for food aid planning be
recognised, and that there be competent leadership in
the field with access to policy makers. Furthermore, it
is apparent that the particular characteristics of a
monitoring and evaluation system will depend on
factors in each individual country, and that no
general, a priori design can be suggested. This does not
mean that there should not be a design: it is necessary
for the system to extend beyond the boundaries of
individual recipient countries to embrace the
programming of food aid as a whole. This is essential if
the global, or donor-end, policy decisions are to be
identified and the necessary data provided for
improved decisions to be made.
V Conclusion
This article has stressed the difficulty of resolving any
debates on, or improving any form of food aid
management without much closer attention to the
impact of food aid programmes. It has, however, been
argued that the impact cannot be measured casually,
building on inadequate ex post evaluation. Rather, a
comprehensive impact assessment system is required,
in which the questions to be asked are identified at an
early stage of project preparation and in which
resources are provided for those questions to be
answered during the lifetime of the project.
A system for monitoring and evaluating the impact of
food aid will face a wide range of issues. This is
inevitable given the complex effect of food aid, the
diverse forms that it can take and the many types of
recipient country into which it is injected. The article
has shown that the information requirements for
comprehensive impact assessment will be large and
costly, and that, given the rudimentary character of
data collection organisations in many developing
countries and the unreliability of statistics, extra
resources will have to be found.
However, there may be ways to reduce the financial
burden: systems should be purposively selective; they
should adopt a step by step approach; and they should
make the greatest possible use of rapid appraisal
techniques, especially in rural areas. Nevertheless,
attempts to simplify the monitoring and evaluation
task should not eclipse the need for an integrated,
global system and for decisions about data limitation
to be made explicit.
The way forward can now be discerned. Donors and
recipients should recognise that the monitoring and
evaluation function in food aid programmes has been
neglected and should match this recognition by a
commitment of will and money. It will then be
necessary to set up some case studies of countries at
different levels of development and with different
types of food aid programme, and consider what
monitoring and evaluation system would be both
appropriate and feasible. The implications of the
results for programme-wide, donor-level monitoring
and evaluation systems should also be considered. It is
only by studying the requirements of country case
studies in detail that the problems inherent in setting
up improved systems will become apparent.
It is clear, however, even at this stage, that there will be
a cost to the donor and possibly to the recipient in
setting up improved systems; and even if the financial
cost to the recipient can be carried by the donor, there
will be a cost in terms of scarce personnel, especially in
rural areas. For this reason, there is a great deal to be
said for greater donor coordination, not only in
obtaining information in the short run but also in
building up indigenous research capacity in the
recipient countries. Some kind of inter-agency task
force may be appropriate, perhaps based on the
international agencies where recipient countries also
have a voice: the Committee on Food Aid and the
World Food Programme might be the most
appropriate vehicles, although it would be important
to achieve close cooperation with other major donors
such as the EEC and the United States.
But whatever the form of action, let it be agreed that
something must be done, and done as quickly as
possible. The multiplication of one-off evaluation
visits which has become such a feature of the
development business in general is particularly
damaging in the food aid field: it is a costly, ineffective
and inappropriate way to work. Impact assessment
has for too long played a bit part on the food aid stage:
it is time it saw its name in lights.
For references see page 61.
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